ABSTRACT Mobile crowdsensing is a novel sensing scheme, where some mobile users utilize the equipped mobile phones to jointly participate in a sensing activity. In this paper, we focus on a self-organized mobile crowdsensing, in which the requesters publish a sensing task to sense the specific data for an area (for example, taking a photo), and the users move around the area, when they enter the specific area, they could be recruited, and then they could take the sensing data, and deliver the data to the activity requester. If the requester recruits a user, a cost should be paid, however, if the sensing data is successfully delivered to the requester, the requester could get a high-value achievement. In order to maximize the requester's profit, in this paper, we propose a user recruitment strategy for self-organized mobile crowdsensing (UROC), which first estimate the expected profit of recruiting a user, compared the profit with the recruiting cost, a decision is made in terms of whether to recruit the user. We have done the simulations based on the randomwaypoint mobility pattern and a real-world trace: roma/taxi. Simulation results show that, UROC achieves an approximate sensing task delivery ratio, while the highest requester profit, when compared with the other strategies.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the development of smartphones with powerful processors and all kinds of sensors, mobile crowdsensing, is proposed [1] to leverage the power of a group of mobile users being coordinated for performing a crowdsensing task through their equipped devices. Along with the data addressing and collection, some new crowdsensing services are superior to traditional sensing that relies on deployment of stationary sensors for monitoring. The new-scheme services are born ranging from using the GPS sensors to sense the traffic jam and using the cameras to do the available parking searching to air quality measuring (CO 2 ) and public opinion warning [2] - [4] .
By now, the research in terms of mobile crowdsensing mainly focuses on user recruitment strategies [5] - [8] , and incentive mechanisms [9] - [13] . Among them, a common challenge is to measure which user's device can contribute most (sensing data delivery ratio, sensing data delivery time, etc.) for collecting the sensing data. Therefore, recent researches propose that user recruitment is an important topic in mobile crowdsensing. However, existing researches mainly focus on recruiting a user, who has a better delivery performance to the requester, while ignoring the trade-off between the sensing data achievement and the recruiting cost. It must not be a good performance, if the recruiting cost (too much recruiters) is unacceptable even though the sensing data will be delivered in a high probability. Fig. 1 illustrates user recruitment and sensing data deliver process for self-organized mobile crowdsensing, where a mobile task requester R publishes a mobile crowdsensing task to a PoI (Point of Interest) (for example, the task is to take a picture in the PoI). When the task is published to the PoI, there are some users staying in or moving towards the PoI, we attempt to recruit some users in the PoI to take the sensing task (i.e, take a photo) and finish the sensing data delivery to the requester before the deadline. If the sensing data is successfully delivered, the requester could get a highvalue achievement. However, if the requester recruits a user, a cost should be also paid. Hence, in order to maximize profit (achievement minus cost) of the requester, we should decide a suitable uesr recruiting strategy.
A key issue for the above self-organized mobile social crowdsensing is to decide whether to recruit a new arrival user, taking the requester's total profit into consideration. This problem is challenging because: 1) The contribution of a new arrival user depends on the situations of the previous arrival users, hence, it is difficult for us to predict the expected profit. 2) It is hard for us to decide whether to stop recruiting more users, because we do not know the relationship between the user's contribution and the arrival time.
In this paper, in order to solve the above challenge problems, we formulate the crowdsensing recruiting problem as the following two parts: one is a predicting problem, where we use the probability distribution of intermeeting time between the user and the requester to predict the delivery ratio of the sensing data. The other problem is an ordinary differential equations (ODE) problem, where we attempt to measure the expected contribution of a user through differentiating the delivery ratio with respect to the number of recruiters. Then, according to the achievement and cost, a suitable recruiting strategy is proposed to maximize the expected profit of the requester. Finally, we text the proposed strategies in both the random-waypoint moving model and a real-world trace: roma/taxi. The simulations provided the following information: UROC achieves an approximate sensing task delivery ratio, while the highest requester profit.
The main contributions of this paper are briefly summarized as follows:
• In mobile crowdsensing, we propose a method to estimate the expected profit of recruiting a user, through predicting their contact probability.
• Based on the predicted user's profit, we propose a User Recruitment strategy for self-Organized mobile Crowdsensing (UROC), in order to maximize the requester's profit.
• We text the proposed strategies in both the randomwaypoint moving model and a real-world trace: roma/taxi. The simulations provided the following information: UROC achieves an approximate sensing task delivery ratio, while the highest requester profit.
We organize the paper as follows: In Section II, we formulate the problem as math symbols. The expected recruiting profit of a user is calculated in Section III. The user recruitment strategy UROC is proposed in Section IV. We evaluate the strategy performance in Section V. We review the related work and conclude the paper in Sections VI and VII, respectively. 
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM FORMULATION A. NETWORK MODEL
We consider a self-organized mobile crowdsensing environment, which includes a set of users:
One of the users could publish a sensing task, and then the task-publishing user turns to be the requester R. The sensing task is published to a PoI and accepted by the passing users, and then they try to deliver the sensing data to the requester, in order to finish the sensing task. The user could be recruited to accept the sensing task if it enters the PoI. If a user is recruited, a cost is paid by the requester. However, if the sensing data is successfully delivered to the requester, the requester will win a high-value achievement. All the users have a same communication range, if a user with the sensing data encounters (in the communication range) a requester, the user can finish the sensing message to the requester. We also do the following assumptions: the contact time and bandwidth are long enough. The main notations are illustrated in Table 1 .
B. PROBLEM
We pay attention to the above self-organized network model. Without loss of generality, the requester will publish a sensing task to a PoI at time t 0 , and the current time is T . R d means the sensing data delivered deadline. Only the users in a PoI during time t and time t +R d can be recruited to deliver to the requester. If a user is recruited, a cost is paid by the requester. However, if the sensing data is successfully delivered to the requester, the requester will win a high-value achievement. As shown in Fig. 2 , users C, D and E have been recruited by now, and user B is currently in the PoI, it is hard for us to measure whether we should recruit the user B. This is because the recruited users have a probability to have delivered the sensing data to the requester, if so, the cost to recruit the user B is wasted. However, if the sensing data has not been delivered by now, the user B could improve the deliver probability in the remaining time. Hence, we should measure the expected profit for the user B, in order to achieve the optimal solution. Moreover, is it necessary for us to measure all the coming users or we could achieve a way to decide a stop point for recruiting the other users. As shown in Fig. 2 , user A is not recruited and will come in the PoI, if we reject to recruit user B, should we continue to consider user A. As described above, in order to make the profit of the requester maximum, the following two problems come up.
The first question is that, when a user enters the PoI during t and t + R d , whether to recruit the user in the PoI, taking the recruiting cost and task achievement into consideration. The purpose is to maximize the expected profit of the reqeuster.
The second question is that, if we decide not to recruit the entering user, should we continue considering the following coming users, or just stop recruiting anymore.
III. USER'S EXPECTED RECRUITING PROFIT
In mobile crowdsensing, sensing data is delivered through random pairwise encounter between the recruiter and the requester. Thus, the intermeeting time between them has an important impact on the sensing data. Hence, we give the following definition:
Definition 1: Intermeeting time: the interval time between the twice meetings in a row.
The existing work [14] has proved that intermeeting times matches exponential distribution in many traces, for example, random-waypoint and random direction. In order to prove this in our simulation, we test the distribution of intermeeting times and measure that whether they has an exponential distribution.
As shown in Fig. 3 , the intermeeting times follow approximately an exponential distribution for the two scenarios:
Suppose that λ matches the exponential distribution of intermeeting time. E represents the mathematical average values; then λ = 1 E . First of all, our goal is to maximize the expected profit of the requester, while the deliver achievement of the sensing data and the paid cost for each recruiter is fixed. Then, we should have a clear relationship between the sensing data delivery ratio and the recruiting user. Hence, we try to express the P T as recruiters n(T ), and then we show the expected contribution of user by measuring the impact of recruiting the user or not.
The probability for the sensing data to be delivered to the requester is shown by that the sensing data has been successfully uploaded at time T and the probability that it does not upload now, but will be uploaded in the remaining time R d . Then Eq. 2 is shown as follows:
where P d is the probability that the sensing data does not upload at time T , while P r represents the probability that the sensing data has not been delivered at time T while could be delivered before R d . Supposing that, now the time is T , and by now, there are n(T ) users have been recruited in the PoI, their recruited times are recorded as t 1 , t 2 , · · · , t n(T ) , therefore, according to the notations defined in Table. 1, P notd is shown as the probability that, recruiter 1 has not been delivered at time T , and recruiter 2 has not too, · · · , all the recruiters by now have not delivered the sensing data to the requester:
P r as shown in Eq. 4 represents the probability that the n(T ) recruiters could upload the sensing data to the requester before the deadline R d .
Combining the Eqs. 3, 4, and P notd = 1 − P d , we achieve the final expression of Eq. 2:
Next, we consider the first recruiter in PoI, assuming that the initial publishing time of the sensing task is t 0 , and the recruiting time for the first user is t 1 , then the expected contribution (improving in delivery ratio of sensing data) is defined as P 1 :
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Moreover, if the sensing data is delivered successfully, then the requester will achieve the deliver achievement A, so the expected profit of the requester to recruit the first entering user is shown as follows:
For the following coming users, supposing that the current time is T , and by now there are n(T ) recruiters in the mobile crowdsensing. As shown in Eq. 5, the probability that the sensing data has been delivered is P d , if we recruit the current entering user, the probability that the sensing data has been delivered will not change, however, the probability that the sensing data does not upload at time T while could be delivered before R d , which is defined as P r could improve. Meanwhile, n(T ) could increase by 1. We could measure the expected contribution by deriving the effect of increasing n(T ) by one on delivery ratio:
There is an important skill in this step, it is worth noting that P notd is fixed when the previous entering nodes are fixed. In other words, when t 1 , t 2 , · · · , t k are decided, then we could achieve P d and P notd , hence, the following recruiting actions will not influence the P d and P notd , while will have an impact on P r , which means the probability that the sensing data does not upload at time T while could be delivered before R d .
Similar with the previous situation, the expected profit for recruiting the current user is achieved by the result of the deliver achievement multiply by the probability to deliver the sensing data and is shown as follows:
Then, we could achieve the current time T , and the PoI could record the previous recruited times: t 1 , t 2 , · · · , t n(T ) , and the parameter λ is decided by the trace, hence we could calculate E n(T ) in an easy way. As shown in Fig. 4 , red points represent the recruited users, and the yellow point represents the requester, we could estimate the contact probability between the requester and the recruiters.
In conclusion, the expected profit to recruit the first user is E 1 , and for the following entering user, if the number of recruiters is n(T ), the expected profit is E n(T ) , we could decide whether to recruit the current user according to comparison between the expected profit and the recruiting cost.
IV. USER RECRUITMENT STRATEGY
In this section, for making the expected profit of the requester maximum. The users moving around the PoI, they enter the PoI as a specific order, if the requester decides to recruit a user, it should pay the user the recruiting cost, while the user will take the requester a deliver achievement, the requester should decide that, whether to recruit the user, in order to maximize the expected profit.
Algorithm 1 UROC User Recruitment Scheme

Input:
Entering users along with time:
Wether to recruit s i : 1 means recruit, while 0 means not recruit 1: for i = 1 to k do In the previous section, we achieve the requester's expected profit for recruiting a user through estimating the contact probability between the user and the requester before the sensing data's deadline. The deliver achievement for a sensing data is known for the requester, then according to the Eq. 9, the requester could calculate the expected achievement if the requester recruits the user. The purpose of this paper is to maximize the requester's profit, we should recruit the user, whose expected profit is higher than the recruiting cost (the money paid for the user). Finally, the algorithm is achieved.
As shown in Algorithm 1, there are k users passing by the PoI, according to the entering time, they are listed as u 1 , u 2 , · · · , u k . For any entering user u i , the requester calculates its expected profit E i , if E i > C, which means that if the requester recruits the user, it will have an expected positive profit, hence the requester will recruit the user and return 1. Otherwise, the requester will not recruit the user, and return 0. Through the above method, the requester could maximize its profit through a suitable recruiting scheme.
It is worth noting that, in the 7th line of Algorithm 1, if a user is rejected to be recruited, the requester will stop the loop, which means that the requester will not recruit the following coming users. The reason to do the above selection is shown in Theorem 1.
Theorem 1: In order to maximize the requester's profit, if a user is reject to be recruited, then the following coming users should also be rejected.
Proof: There are a lot of users passing by the PoI, an easy recruitment strategy is to judge the contributions of all the users, and decide whether to recruit them one by one. However, this method will take a lot of computation resource. Moreover, an interesting characteristic of the user is found that, the expected contact probability between a specific user and the requester decreases along with the time, which means that the expected contribution is a decreasing function of time. Under the condition that, the deliver achievement and the recruiting cost are fixed, we could obviously find a clear time to stop recruiting the users.
As shown in Eq. 10, the contribution of a new coming user could be measured by P n(T ) , in order to make it clear that the relationship between the contribution and the n(T ), P n(T ) takes the derivative of n(T ), the result is shown in Eq. 10.
And then, P n(T ) < 0. Therefore, when n(T ) > 1, with the growth of n(T ), P n(T ) appears to be an decrease trend, which means that the contribution of the user has the following regular pattern: the current user has a larger contribution than that of the later coming user.
Next, we consider a special case that, when n(T ) = 1, then according to
. This situation is similar with that n(T ) = 0 in Eq. 10. Hence, the contribution of the second user is obviously lower than that of the first user. Therefore, the optimal recruiting strategy is to recruit the user, whose expected profit is higher than the recruiting cost until encountering a user, whose expected profit is lower than the recruiting cost, and stop recruiting anyone else.
In conclusion, we could decide whether to recruit the current user according to the Algorithm UROC, which first calculates the expected recruiting profit through Section III, and then, if the recruiting cost is higher than the recruiting profit, the current is rejected to be recruited. Otherwise, the current users will be recruited.
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
The random-waypoint mobility pattern and, roma/taxi trace set [15] , [16] are used to test the proposed scheme. We randomly select a PoI and a user as the requester (Fig. 5) , and the other users as the common users. The detailed simulation parameters in this network environment are listed in Table 2 .
A. ALGORITHMS AND PERFORMANCES IN COMPARISON
To test the manifestations of the proposed scheme, we have done the simulations from the two aspects: (1) the proof of Theorem 1 and (2) sensing task delivery ratio for UROC.
For the first part, in order to test the relationship between the expected profit and the simulation time, we compare the deliver contributions among the different simulation time, in the random-waypoint moving model and real world trace roma/taxi. When a user enters the PoI, we test the deliver contribution and also record the entering time.
Then, in the second simulations, we try to measure that whether UROC could get the highest performance when we recruit the users as the proposed manner in this paper, compared to the other two recruitment strategies: UROC-K and UROC-G. UROC, which recruits the users, who have a higher expected profit than the recruiting cost. UROC-K recruits k users, who enter the PoI firstly, in this paper, we set k as 5 in both two simulation environments for UROC-K. UROC-G greedily recruits users until the deliver achievement is all paid for the recruiting cost, which means that it will recruit A/C users in the PoI.
The following two performances are considered in the simulation part: (1) Delivery Ratio, successfully delivered sensing data divided by total number of data in PoIs. (2) Expected Profit, which is the expected profit (deliver achievement minus total recruiting cost) for the requester.
B. SIMULATION RESULTS
1) PROOF OF THEOREM 1
To test the correctness of Theorem 1 through simulation, we test the delivery ratios along with the simulation time for UROC, in the random-waypoint moving model and a realworld data set: roma/taxi (Fig. 6 ).
As shown in Fig. 6-(a) , in random-waypoint mobility pattern, along with the simulation time, the deliver contribution (the improved deliver probability) are tested. For the first entering user, the deliver contribution is highest and close to 0.9. However, as the time goes, the deliver contributions of the following coming users are lower and lower. Therefore, the simulation results prove that, along with the simulation time increase, the deliver contribution of the entering users come down. In other words, if a user's expected contribution is lower than the expectation of requester, then the expected contributions of the following coming users must be lower than the expectation of requester. Therefore, in order to maximize the requesterąŕs profit, if a user is reject to be recruited, then the following coming users should also be rejected.
The results in Fig. 6 -(b) are similar with that of Fig. 6-(a) , hence, we omit detailed descriptions of Fig. 6-(b) . However the simulation time of Fig. 6-(b) is longer than that of Fig. 6-(a) , therefore, with the condition that the entering interval is the same, the real-world data set: roma/taxi have more results. In conclusion, according to the simulation results of Fig. 6 , theorem 1 is proved.
2) DELIVERY RATIO OF SENSING DATA
To evaluate the performances of UROC, we first conduct two groups of simulations using the random-waypoint moving model and the real-world roma/taxi trace. The recruiters in the PoI are sources and we treat the requester as the destination. The optimizing goal is to recruit the best user set to achieve the highest requester's profit, with in the condition of an acceptable delivery performance from sources to the destination, taking both the deliver achievement and the recruiting cost. To test the performance of UROC, the delivery ratio of sensing data and the requester's expected profit are considered in Fig. 7 and Fig. 8 .
UROC continues recruiting a set of users, until a user's expected deliver achievement is lower than its recruiting cost. Therefore, the purpose of UROC is to maximize the expected profit of the requester. However, UROC-K fixedly recruits k users, without considering the specific profit. UROC-G greedily recruits a set of users, whose number is equal to A/C. A represents the total achievement of the requester if the sensing data is successfully delivered, while C is the recruiting cost for a user. Importantly, UROC-G will achieve a higher delivery ratio, while a lower expected profit, because it assume all the deliver achievement for recruiting the users.
As shown in Fig. 7 , we test the delivery ratios and expected profits of the above three user recruitment strategies (UROC, UROC-K, UROC-G), along with the growth of PoI radius, TTL, Successful reward, and Recruiting cost. Focusing on the delivery ratio, it is not difficult to find that, along with the increases of PoI radius and TTL, the delivery ratios appear to be an upward trend. The above phenomenons are reasonable because a larger PoI radius could lead to a higher deliver probability, meanwhile, a longer TTL will also cause a larger contact probability. Moreover, the delivery ratios of the above three strategies are similar and comparable. While the performance in terms of expected profits of them are so much different. UROC always achieve the highest expected profit, which means that the purpose to maximize the deliver ratio is achieved. And then, along with the increases of successful reward, the expected profit of the UROC, UROC-K, UROC-G are all increasing, which means that the method will get a higher profit for requester, it is easy for us to understand, because the deliver achievement changes to be a higher value, then the requester will achieve a higher profit. However, when the recruiting cost is improving, the expected profit for the requester is decreasing, this is also reasonable, because a higher recruiting cost leads to a lower requester's profit. This is also proved by the simulation results of Fig. 7 .
The similar simulations are run for a real world trace: roma/taxi, the simulation results are shown in Fig. 8 , where the simulation settings are the same with that of randomwaypoint mobility pattern. Along with the increases of PoI radius and TTL, the delivery ratios also increase. This is also natural and reasonable, meanwhile, a longer TTL will also cause a larger contact probability. Moreover, the delivery ratios of the above three strategies are similar and comparable. While the performance in terms of expected profits of them are totally different. UROC always achieve the highest expected profit in the real world trace roma/taxi, which means that the purpose to maximize the deliver ratio is also achieved in real trace. Finally, the performances in terms of successful reward and recruiting cost are similar with that in Fig. 7 . We omit detailed descriptions of Fig. 8 because its simulation results are similar to those of Fig. 7 .
In conclusion, in the random-waypoint mobility pattern and the real world data set roma/taxi, we test the delivery ratio of sensing data and the expected profit in terms of the three recruitment strategies, along with the change of PoI radius, TTL, Successful reward and Recruiting cost. The simulation results show that, UROC achieves an approximate sensing task delivery ratio, while the highest requester profit.
VI. RELATED WORK
By now, the researches in this area focus on the two problems: (1) stimulating users to participate in a crowdsensing activity (incentive mechanisms) and (2) recruiting the users to finish the crowdsensing task (recruitment strategy).
A. INCENTIVE MECHANISMS
Wang et al. [17] provides a novel auction formulation, to make the expected payment as less as possible for meeting the constraint of the quality requirement. Yang et al. [18] VOLUME 6, 2018 FIGURE 7. Performance comparisons on the random-waypoint mobility pattern: delivery ratio and expected profit. present two models for mobile crowdsensing, one is a platform-centric model and other one is a user-centric model. Han et al. [19] propose a new Bayesian pricing strategy to make the total payment as less as possible, while in a reasonable sensing quality, and also provide a method to solve the optimization problem with a submodular one. Luo et al. [20] propose a all-pay auctions incentive mechanism in crowdsensing environment. Feng et al. [21] focus on encouraging mobile users with smartphones to join mobile crowdsourcing applications, a mechanism with two main components called TRAC is also proposed, which is based on the reverse auction framework. Zheng et al. [22] design a collection scheme called VENUS for crowd-sensed data markets, which is for maximizing the profit. In [23] , they design RIT as a Robust Incentive Tree mechanism for mobile crowdsensing which combines the advantages of auctions and incentive trees. And in [24] , a social incentive mechanism is proposed, which asks the recruiters to incentivizes their friends to participate in the crowdsensing task.
The above works focus on proposing incentive mechanisms based in mobile crowdsensing. However, the proposed methods could not be directly used in the recruitment strategy, and they also do not consider the profit of requester in mobile crowdsensing.
B. RECRUITMENT STRATEGY
Hassani et al. [25] design a novel context-aware recruitment strategy for opportunistic mobile crowdsensing to assign sensing tasks to the most suitable participants, tanking the energy consumption into consideration. Xiao et al. [26] a deadline-sensitive user recruitment in mobile crowdsensing and provide a greedy DUR algorithm taking the submodular into consideration. Li et al. [27] propose a dynamic worker recruitment with diverse sensing tasks, which tries to minimize the sensing cost and also maintain a reliable coverage level. Yi et al. [28] consider a problem which aims to recruit vehicle participants and provides a linear-time approximation algorithm to solve the VPR problem. Pu et al. [29] formulate an online worker selection problem, for making the expected quality of service as large as possible and also propose the dynamic programming principle. Karaliopoulos et al. [30] formulate an optimization problem for minimizing the cost in mobile crowdsensing. Zhou et al. [31] propose a crowdsensing based approach, in order to detect rogue APs in camouflage without specialized hardware requirement.
However, almost all the above works do not focus on maximizing the requester's profit, taking both the deliver achievement and recruiting cost into consideration, and also ignore the research focusing on self-organized mobile crowdsensing.
VII. CONCLUSION
We have looked into the problem of user recruitment in selforganized mobile crowdsensing campaigns drawing on ODE model. First, we formulate the maximizing profit problem as the recruiting problem. Then, according to the recruiting cost and deliver achievement, we propose a User Recruitment strategy for self-Organized mobile Crowdsensing (UROC), which first estimate the expected profit of recruiting a user, compared the profit with the recruiting cost, a decision is made in terms of whether to recruit the user. Moreover, We prove that if one user is rejected to be recruited by the requester, then the requester should stop recruiting the following coming users. We have done the simulations based on the random-waypoint mobility pattern and a real-world trace: roma/taxi. Simulation results show that, UROC achieves an approximate sensing task delivery ratio, while the highest requester profit, when compared with the other strategies.
